Developing O'Connors account
In this post I will take O'Connors ideas concerning necessary existence and run with it. At the end of my previous post I briefly mentioned that we should regard necessary existence itself as concrete, and not as a mere property or part of a necessary being. This is also where I want to start. We have established by now that ultimate explanations require the fundamentality of existence in a necessary nature. Everything else leads to an abrupt stopping point where further questions could be asked. If instantiated concepts in general require an external explanations (they're not self-explanatory) , it's hard to see how we could rationally affirm that this isn't the case in some cases. The only thing different is the kind of concept instantiated. What does follow however from existence being fundamental? First of all, within the necessary being, every additional property it has is entailed by existence. The entailment makes only one kind of necessary being possible. ...