Developing O'Connors account

In this post I will take O'Connors ideas concerning necessary existence and run with it. 

At the end of my previous post I briefly mentioned that we should regard necessary existence itself as concrete, and not as a mere property or part of a necessary being. This is also where I want to start. 

We have established by now that ultimate explanations require the fundamentality of existence in a necessary nature. Everything else leads to an abrupt stopping point where further questions could be asked. If instantiated concepts in general require an external explanations (they're not self-explanatory) , it's hard to see how we could rationally affirm that this isn't the case in some cases. The only thing different is the kind of concept instantiated. 

What does follow however from existence being fundamental? First of all, within the necessary being, every additional property it has is entailed by existence. The entailment makes only one kind of necessary being possible. 

Why is that though? The grounding of nature by existence needn't be rehashed here again, but what is it that makes it unique? Say the suggestion is that two physicals, e.g. two fields, are suggested as necessary beings. This requires existence to entail two kinds of properties. To illustrate the concern, conceive of ontology as ordered in layers. On the most fundamental level there's the necessary being, its existence and entailed properties. How does the proposal of a multitude of necessary beings fare here? 

The answer is, unsurprisingly: not good. There are two ways we can conceive of the necessary beings' relation to necessary existence in the proposal at hand. For one we can assume that necessary existence is within the nature of the necessary being. The other way is to conceive of it as the most fundamental layer of reality from which the rest of the properties emanate, so to speak. The former proposal has the problem of an explanatory circle. If necessary existence is only instantiated given that the whole exists, however the whole still being dependent upon existence, we arrive at a mutual dependence incompatible with the initial supposition of its ultimacy. The logical follow-up question about the causal priority would conclude with an affirmation of circular causation, however nothing that is caused in a circle could be ultimate. Given that a and b only exist given the other ones existence we're left with no answer as to how it is that a and b exist. 

Then let us put our attention to the more promising, second answer. Let me remind you that the interlucor should be interested in integrating necessary existence into the nature of the necessary being and not stepping into the danger of making existence independent. I assume that the interlucor is interested in proposing an entity that can be fit to fit the bill, so to speak, that it can be the ultimate locus of explanation without being God. Platonists, Thomists and in general Scholastics however will recognize the idea of independent existence as the fundamental layer as having considerable overlap with their own position. 

Therefore the objector is well advised to propose an account in which existence isn't a being in and of itself. How does the developed so far fit with the idea of multiple necessary beings? The immediate problem is that given the entailment of existence to the rest of the properties, every proposal involving a multitude of beings results in at least one of them not being integrated with necessary existence within the same nature. Let me explain: Suppose N(ature)1 and N2 are proposed as necessary beings, both entailed by N(ecessary) E(xistence). NE can only be a part of either one at most, on pain of violating the logical axiom of self-identity. The entailment by NE tells us something important about it, namely that NE is in such a way as to that it necessarily is conjoined with a particular set of properties, as opposed to others. We have already seen that the affirmation of a multitude of possible natures conjoined with NE either leads to brute contingency or otherwise prematurely aborts the quest for explanation. However the proposal is incoherent on its own. NE, as the most fundamental "thing" there is, shouldn't be seen as being merely conjoined to N1 or N2. Remember that NE provides an asymmetrical explanation here, it explains the reality of the properties, while the properties can't be the ontological explanation for NE. What this tells us is that the properties reflect something very real about the nature of NE itself. So if we say for the sake of argument that the necessary being is an electron, what this means is that necessary existence itself an electron. This may sound strange, and that's the point. It's insufficient to affirm that NE necessarily causes electrons, for that would only result in a de dictonecessity of electrons, making their being distinct from NE. Rather the way NE is, must in a relevant way be reflected by electrons. This reflection is a tight unity of NE to the rest of the properties, to use O'Connors terminology. This tight unity makes a second relationship of the same kind to other properties impossible unless we introduce contingency to produce some wiggle room here. At most we can say that two natures are necessarily caused, comparable to the One causing the Intellect and the Worldsoul. But at the fundamental level, there can be only one. 

We have arrived at uniqueness. Initially I planned to refute the suggestion of any kind of physical necessary being here, but I reserve that for a later post. Instead I want to finish with alluding what O'Connors account is gesturing at. I also only note the implication that the idea of a physical necessity will eventually collapse into an extreme monism, rather than pursuing that any further here. 

Instead I want to once again focus on what a theist would have to conclude about the nature of the necessary being. As has been stated multiple times by now, what's at the fundament is necessary existence, absolutely independent and entailing of any other property. To repeat what I previously said about the first way to conceive of a necessary being, on pain of a vicious circle, it can't be dependent on being instantiated within the necessary being. NE must be somewhat independent, it's the only property that is absolute. O'Connor, who is skeptical about absolute simplicity, albeit he himself isn't sure whether his own view falls short of that, wants us to imagine that the ultimate being is roughly made up of two layers; the most fundamental is NE, the second lowest layer are the rest of the properties entailed by it. These two constitute the necessary being. 

Which kinds of properties will be entailed? I'll only allude to further arguments here, but the principle of proportionate causality can be used to defend knowledge, while gesturing at existence being the broadest category on which every entity is dependent justifies power. Omnipotence even, as seems clear to me, for every entity, actual or merely possible, given that none of them have existence as part of their nature. Concrete, conceptual and abstract objects, at the end of the day all of these are dependent on the necessary being, either as divine ideas as in divine conceptualism or as a relation comparable of universals upon the form of the good (I duly note that Lloyd Gerson questions whether such a distinction can be made at all). However this entity already very much looks like God. 

At last though, what about simplicity? Remember that the properties reflect the nature of NE. And this is exactly why O'Connor is unsure about whether his view at the end is the same as that of Aquinas; the "tight unity" he wants to affirm will only arise if there is an actual distinction to be made between existence and power. If existence itself is powerful, as is the case given that it is what entails everything else, then the distinction can't be made, given that power/omnipotence would then just be a predicate of what existence is. The same with knowledge/omniscience. Given that two distinct divine ideas share their root in existence, it seems plausible that existence must in some way be mind-like. Of course it's indisputable that it vastly differs from what we conceive a mind to be, as it is completely unlike ours. Being is what unifies the mindful and the mindless entities within the same origin. Only the unifying stopping point avoids a vicious regress. Thus we see good reasons to affirm the convertibility of being to power and knowledge. At the end this is all that the proponent of simplicity requires. God could certainly have the properties of power and knowledge distinctively, but, to use the terminology of the late James Ross, these share the same referent. As far as I can see unless it is presupposed that God shares the same properties univocally, we have no reason to affirm complexity. And thus we can see that a thorough questioning of the nature of beings will naturally lead to a ultimate simple being that is identical to its existence. 

This post has taken a lot longer than I planned. However it gave myself some clarity on certain issues, like the proposal of a necessary physical being on which, so I believe, I made important progress which I intend to publish.