In defense of Timothy O'Connor against William Lane Craig on Necessary Existence (Responding to the Article)
In this post I will turn my tides to William Lane Craigs' review of Timothy O'Connors book "Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency". In my last post I explained and defended O'Connors arguments about the nature of a necessary being. In this post I'll defend him against the objections of Craig. His review can be found here:
Of course I won't answer the whole essay, I'm currently not interested in arguing about the ontological status of possible worlds or abstract objects. Hence I'll begin my quotations from more in the middle of the text, the passages that concern the exact paragraph of O'Connor, which I treated, as well as additional thoughts of Craig on necessary beings.
"In O’Connor’s view the essential properties of a necessary being must form a tight unity:
They must be so bound up with one another that any one could not exist in the absence of the others . . . . A fully adequate grasp of such a being’s nature would involve a recognition of the intimate interdependency or interconnectedness of these attributes in broadly the way we recognize the internal connection between triangularity and trilaterality in two-dimensional Euclidean geometry . . . .”(p. 132)."
What O'Connor argues in the passage quoted by Craig seems to be that there is an interconnectedness of essential properties within the necessary being, such that if its nature is fully understood, we'd see that the conjunction of properties at hand would be necessarily connected, none of the properties could be abstracted from another and conceived as in relation to different properties, unless its nature isn't fully grasped.
"I found the argument of this section very strange and among the least perspicuous of the book. It needs to be kept in mind that when O’Connor speaks of a necessary being, he means a being which exists not only necessarily but a se (p. 155, n. 7), so that beings that are necessary ab alio do not enter the picture. He asks, “Is the property of necessary existence something that results from the rest of its essential nature, or from some part of its nature?” (p. 87). It’s hard to know even what to make of this question. I suppose it might mean, “Is there some other property which is explanatorily prior to necessary existence?” Perhaps not; but one could imagine a plausible Scotist or Anselmian answer that the property of supreme perfection or of maximal greatness is even more fundamental than necessary existence. O’Connor’s response to his question is negative, because “then there being ‘in the first place,’ so to speak, a thing having the ‘base’ set of properties giving rise to necessary existence would itself be a contingent fact, which contradicts the assumption that NB is truly necessary” (p. 87). The grammatical subject of this obscure sentence is “there being a thing” and the predicate is “would be a contingent fact.” So the complaint is that the fact that this thing exists would be a contingent fact. Now the thing seems to be the object having all the properties of a necessary being once necessary existence is abstracted away. In the explanatorily prior moment (“in the first place”), we have the nature without necessary existence, e.g., maximal greatness and all that follows from it apart from necessary existence. Now obviously there is no suggestion that such an object could be instantiated as such, without necessary existence, so that it would be a contingent being; au contraire, necessary existence necessarily follows from its other properties. But O’Connor’s claim is that the fact that there would in that explanatorily prior moment be such an entity is a contingent fact.
But that seems wrong: abstract necessary existence from the nature of a necessary being, and necessarily what is left over is a thing with all the remaining properties."
Craig turns on to O'Connors treatment of the question as to whether necessary existence is basic or if it results from the nature of the being or some part of it. He suggests that "perfection" might be underlying necessary existence. O'Connors objection was, that everything underlying or being prior to existence runs contrary to the assumption of necessary existence, resulting in a mere conditionally necessary being.
It's hard to actually make sense of Craigs suggestions here. Of course, if you analyze the nature of a necessary being and abstract the existence away, you're left with the rest of its properties. I don't know if "maximal greatness" actually designates anything of importance, it seems more like an umbrella term, but this isn't an issue. Suppose that its the term for all the rest of the properties, apart of existence, in collection. Craig argues, given that it's the nature that in conjunction with existence makes up the necessary being, it follows that given that nature, the necessary being, if made actual, couldn't be so contingently, it must be necessary. So far, so good, though I would be more hesitant with the language. What he then goes on to argue is that it's this exact issue that, according to O'Connor, would result in the problematic explanatory priority of nature over existence, making the appearance of the properties, which ultimately entail their existence, a brute contingent fact. But, so Craig, this is false. If you abstract existence away from the necessary being you're left with the rest of the necessary nature.
I can identify two ways in which we can understand the idea, that the rest of the nature, given that it is the nature of a necessary being, and thus must actually entail necessary existence. The idea is either false or true, but irrelevant. The latter is quicker to deal with, so I merely want to point out that of course the nature of the necessary being, meaning, to accommodate Craig, the rest of its properties apart of existence, would have to be necessarily conjoined with necessary existence. This is uncontroversial. There has to be a unique-making property of the necessary beings' essence which reflects the "justification" so to speak, for its necessity. For example it would be quite ridiculous to assume that one of the two identical spheres in Max Blacks thought experiment is necessary while the other is merely contingent. An analysis from both angles, from the mode of being and the essence would reveal this to be nonsense.
In which way is Craigs position false though? It's actually quite simple, when we remember what we mean, when we say that something exists and if we take "entailment", given that he states that " necessary existence necessarily follows from its other properties", as metaphysically substantial.
Craig claims that once you abstract necessary existence away from the rest of the necessary nature, you're necessarily left with a being with all the rest of the properties. From these properties, necessary existence would follow. This is false however. The idea might be possible within the realm of abstractions, but if you remove existence from a necessary nature, you're not left with all the other properties, you're left with nothing, for there couldn't be anything in which these properties are actual. At best you could argue that you have a kind of conceptual existence, making the being in question no more real than Sherlock Holmes. The ascription of omnipotence for example wouldn't be the proposition that the being actually has all powers currently, for the actuality of this attribute presupposes an already existent being, which however has been denied initially by abstracting existence away. The most we could say is that *if* the being would exist, it would necessarily have the rest of those properties, which is uncontroversial however. Something else that could be said is that if the being would exist, given the rest of the properties, we could conclude that it necessarily exist. The actual possibility of it existing contingently isn't a supposition of the argument O'Connor makes.
This all is different though from the substantial metaphysical claim Craig has to make to actually counter O'Connor. Instead in order to actually turn the explanatory priority around, the other properties must actually entail existence. But in order to entail anything, the properties must already be there, so to speak, they must be concrete. But this can't be without them already existing. So we're left with an explanatory circle.
What Craig disputes is that the priority of the nature would make the being in question contingent, given that the nature in question couldn't be anything but necessary. As already said, this is true. However it's neither O'Connors (as I read him) nor my claim that the being in question would be actually contingent, a necessary being either exists of necessity or is impossible. What is rather is that the explanatory priority of existence safeguards ultimacy without collapsing into a circle. In Craigs proposal the properties already would have to be instantiated before entailing existence. This is where the contingency would come into play. Since there is no explanation for the prior instantiation of the properties, it's hard to see how they could be anything but brute, and hence contingent. This isn't to say that this could actually be the case. No, it's rather that we can thus see, that in a necessary being the proposal is an impossibility. We can conclude that Craigs proposal of the explanatory priority of anything but existence is a failure.
Going on:
"Here the problem of the explanatory priority of other properties to the property of necessary existence is that the necessary being would be only conditionally necessary, which presumably is incompatible with aseity. But that untoward consequence does not at all seem to follow. A being which actually has such base properties has essentially necessary existence and exists independently."
Putting aside the dubious supposition that the other properties are also *base* properties, which implies equal fundamentality as necessary existence, this passage actually exemplifies nicely the superiority of O'Connors account to Craigs. Compare this in regards to the question as to why a being is necessary. On Craigs account, as described above, the being exemplifying the particular divine attributes/properties, e.g. omniscience, omnipotence and perfect goodness exists of necessity as these are the kinds of properties possessed by a being that essentially necessarily exists. On O'Connors account, it's necessary existence that's fundamental and the properties are possessed because they are what necessary existence entails. How the latter can be developed I will show in the next post. Suffice for now that these aren't parallel answers. We humans don't have a firm grasp on necessary existence, since we lack any concept of it. Hence it's epistemically possible for someone to ask why existence exists. However for now all I'm asking is for the reader to recognize that if there's one thing that can be plausibly regarded as necessary, it would be existence, meaning a being in which what-ness and that-ness are identical or at least a being in which its that-ness is what entails its what-ness. Once again, the claim being made isn't that omnipotence could be instantiated in a contingent being, I explicitly deny that. But in the case where omnipotence is derived from something that from conceptual analysis alone couldn't be anything but ultimate, we have an explanation family there being an omnipotent being. Craig's account on the other hand faces a dilemma. Either there's an explanation for why omnipotence is instantiated or there isn't. If there is, it seems that we collapse into O'Connors proposal, admitting the priority of existence. Why is that? Because in any other case we're left with the question as to why omnipotence is instantiated. Okay, it's there, because it's related to necessary existence. But where does this property come from? We need an explanation where power comes from. Or knowledge. And goodness. But on the proposal at hand we don't have that and Craig hasn't alluded to anything. Even worse, his idea doesn't make a second necessary being a metaphysical impossibility, ridding us of an explanation for why a particular thing is necessary as opposed to another. This is given on O'Connors thesis, on pain of a contradiction. Again, I will explain that in the next post.
If there is no explanation, omnipotence would be a brute fact. This would eliminate the idea from further consideration. So what would the defender of O'Connors argument say? The being in question with the nature associated with necessary existence couldn't be instantiated contingently. But it being instantiated the way Craig conceives of it is an impossibility as well.
Let's summarize where we're currently at. Craigs account still faces the circularity problem. It also lacks the ability to explain the fundamental beings' nature and is actually in danger of making it brute. And contrary to the position he argues against, the contrast to the contingent mode of existence is lacking. It's not possible to derive uniqueness from the proposal as it stands, which is required however if we want to uphold that there's an explanation as to why the necessary being is truly necessary.
"Of course, a Platonist could run a familiar argument against aseity based on the dependence of a necessary being on its properties; but such an argument would also apply to necessary existence itself even if it were fundamental. The concrete maximally great being depends on nothing, certainly not on the fictitious object existing explanatorily prior to its exemplifying the property of necessary existence."
Here the misunderstanding of what O'Connor is arguing for is best exemplified. If a being has properties as Craigs' Platonist conceives of them, then the being must be dependent upon those properties, meaning there's a priority of explanation here. This also illustrates why Craig doesn't believe in properties, he conceives of them as abstract objects and due to his understanding of them, they are necessary beings outside of God's power.
On the basis of this understanding he wants to argue that the dependency upon the property of necessary existence would also apply even if necessary existence were fundamental.
The problem would perhaps arise if we conceive of the necessary being as a unification of distinct properties, referring to distinct parts, with "necessary existence" being the most fundamental of it. However if you feel the need to be an anti-realist about abstract objects to safeguard the uniqueness of aseity, then the whole setup has been flawed. Above I faulted Craig for carelessness and claimed that the correct analysis of existence would entail the uniqueness of aseity. While the exact argument will be made when developing O'Connors account, I'll sketch it here:
Necessary existence (or arguably existence in general) differs from all other kinds of universals for if, as Platonists argue, universals can exist uninstantiated. Universals in this context serve as representative for all abstract objects, but here they provide a good illustration for what I am trying to convey. Universals exist, they different in their mode of being, but nonetheless, given the circularity objection, they receive their existence externally and thus don't exist a seeven if they're necessarily emanated. Also "existent" and "necessarily existent" can't be mere categories in which existent objects are categorized in, for one it's hard to see what could justify a particular being in one category rather than another, secondly we're dangerously close to making a necessary being into a self-instantiated concept and thirdly, and most importantly, due to saying that it's necessary existence that entails the rest of the properties O'Connor provides us with a way of avoiding the argument by Craigs' Platonist. We can regard necessary existence itself as a concrete entity, giving an explanation both for its ultimacy, but also for how it's capable of entailing anything. Thus there's no underlying abstract property that could refer to anything but the concrete entity itself. And the reader will recognize that, unlike in Craigs own case, his statement that "concrete maximally great being depends on nothing, certainly not on the fictitious object existing explanatorily prior to its exemplifying the property of necessary existence" actually has an explanation in my ontology, and it's not merely a statement of faith.
Much more can be said, but it's not achieving much if I just respond to his whole article, passage by passage. The arguments I made here shows, when reading the rest of Craigs article, that the issues only arise on his very specific of existence or Platonism (which Platonist conceives of abstract objects existing a se? Neither Plato nor Plotinus and it's a mistake to read modern "specialities" back into the tradition). In the next post I will go to develop O'Connors account. There I will show why the priority entails uniqueness and plausibly leads to divine simplicity.
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