Against a necessary singularity

This post is the first in my larger project of showing that nowadays philosophers do not understand the concept of necessary existence. It's more akin to a contingent entity that just happens to have necessary existence due to a unique feature it possesses, be it the first in time or the fundamental ontological level. But being unique in some sense is insufficient. Unless we can see how its uniqueness follows from its nature, we can't rationally affirm the necessity of the one arbitrarily limited thing just on the basis that it exists and the others do not. Note that the initial singularity as the starting point for modality won't help here. The reason why is that the worlds are derivative and thus have existence de dicto. This can also be leveled at the starting point though, for the simple reason that the necessity, as mentioned above, can't be ascribed just because it's the first and the fact that it actually exists. It's important to distinguish between an argument for a first cause and for a necessary being. So in order for the first to be necessary, we must show that it truly exists a se.

In a necessary singularity, all attributes must be necessary, that means its weight, energy level, size, constitution etc. must be the way they are. Alongside its existence, these properties are being possessed essentially. Which already brings us to the crux of the issue; essential properties can't be lost. If they do, a substantial change has occurred, entailing that the object has gone out of existence, while a new one has come about. Socrates could never cease to be human, nor an animal, nor rational. "Loosing" any one of these properties would result in the loss of the rest of them. When the humanity is lost, Socrates isn't anymore. If Socrates isn't, there's no human. The devastating consequences for the "necessary singularity"- hypothesis are immediately clear. Two consequences: 1) Given that the singularity necessarily exists, it cannot cease to exist. 2) Given that all properties are had essentially, not a single one can change its value. The consequence is complete stasis.

We can identify further issues through analyzing the two possible relations the singularity can have in regards to time. Either it was timeless, its expansion being the first event in history, or it came about ex nihiloat the first moment of time. We can immediately eliminate the second option from consideration, for the coming about would only be possible if existence were inessential to it, thereby however contradicting the original assumption that the singularity is necessary. At best we could reach a position like "given the existence of x, x exists necessarily", saying that if x happens to exist, there's no way for x to go out of existence, e.g. through a lack of destructive forces. Despite already having made a proposal inconsistent with existence a se, we can also say that it's hard to see why this statement above is reasonably believed. What could be its truthmaker? Presumably not x itself, given that the coming into being is brute on this view, thus divorcing its nature from existence and cementing its accidentality to the nature. If it brutely happens, why couldn't it brutely cease? Not to mention its ad hocness, the principal lacks a reason for being an eternal truth. So we are left with the initially timeless singularity.

Questions about the coherence of that proposal aside, some arguments here tie in to the debate surrounding a necessary physical object, meaning a physical being that exists a se. However I will treat that on another day.

Returning to the original idea, the history of the universe following a singularity is comparable to ours. The facts we can agree upon is that a change occurred, at least in regards to size, density and shape. These however are essential and thus necessary properties within the singularity, their value was specific and were required to be the way they were. But they changed. How is that possible? Looking at the singularity itself, given that their value were essential, the only possibility left is a substantial change that occurred.

(Disclaimer: The use of "substantial change" is intended as metaphysically innocent in this context and doesn't presuppose the singularity to be a substance. In fact I know that Graham Oppy views it as the first event. The specific argument I'm currently making is not affected by this however.)

However this idea contradicts the assumption of necessity, remember that something that essentially has existence couldn't cease to be. It's the same reason as above, why it can't have a beginning. Denying the necessity of the values is no option however, since we would reintroduce what we tried to remove, namely contingency in the ultimate explanation,  thus violating the PSR.

One may think that given the definition of singularity, we have an entity with infinite mass and density, they are undefined, in general referred to as infinite. Could that solve the problem? No, for the reason this is a problem is not due to a specific value of the property. I'm not making an argument from arbitrary limits and I'm also not questioning whether it's rational to ascribe necessity to one quantity over another, as if a specific number could have ontological priority over another. Rather I'm pointing out that the following three statements constitute an aporetic tetrad. They can't all be true at the same time:

1) The singularity is necessary.
2) The singularity has no brute facts, thus none of its properties are accidental.
3) The singularity undergoes change.

3) is obviously true and can't be denied. 1) and 2) are commitments of the proposal however and I went to great length to show its consequences. I conclude that the idea of a necessary singularity must be deemed a failure.